Ideational Settings of The JDP Foreign Policy And The EU: Romanticisim vs Formalism

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Abstract

In current discourse of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's European identity is not overstated anymore while Turkey's solidarity with other regions is frequently underlined on the base of multiple identities of the country. In addition, Turkish government considers Turkey as a Middle Eastern country as well as European. This multiple solidarity perspective is explained by the governmental officials with culturalist assumptions that are full of critiques against 'vapid' Eurocentric approaches with reference to changing world politics. It is defined as a kind of shift of axis by opposition groups in Turkey. However, Davutoglu accused the opposition of not understanding the changing paradigm of current world politics where multiple identity perspective is not a preference but a necessity. At that point, it is essential to understand ideational settings of the government that demarcate what is important and valuable. Even success analysis is tightly related with ideas and ideologies. So, what is the ideational settings of the JDP foreign policy? Is it a source of shift from European oriented foreign policy of Turkey? Discourse of the leading figures in Turkish foreign policy making processes are critical to answer these questions. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu are chosen as focus of analysis in this study especially during the 61sth Turkish government between 6 July 2011 and 28 August 2014. The main assumption of the study is existence of a changing way of thinking in both Turkey and the European governments. Findings would be interesting to understand contemporary discourse of Turkish foreign policy.

Keywords: JDP, JDP Foreign Policy, EU, European Identity,

Özet

Türk dış politikasının yakın dönem söyleminde Türkiye'nin Avrupalı kimliği eskisinden daha az dile getirilirken farklı bölgesel aidiyetler daha yüksek sesle telaffuz edilir olmuştur. Türkiye'nin Avrupalı olduğu kadar Orta Doğulu bir ülke olduğu açıkça dile getirilmektedir. Bu yaklaşım, ülkenin pek çok farklı kimliği bir arada barındıran bir tarafı olduğu varsayımına dayandırılmaktadır. Yavan olarak nitelenen Türkiye'deki yerleşik Avrupa merkezci yaklaşımları eleştiren hükümet yetkilileri değişen dünya politikasına referans vererek değişen dünyada farklı bir yaklaşıma ihtiyaç olduğundan bahsetmektedirler. Hükümetin bu yöndeki kültür eksenli açıklamalarının Batı karşıtı ve Doğu sempatizanı niteliğinden dolayı Türkiye'nin bir eksen kayması yaşadığı çeşitli defalar dile getirilmiştir. AKP dış politikasının düşünsel anlamda önemli inşacılarından olan Ahmet Davutoğlu bu eksen kayması söyleminin dahi değişen dünya politikasındaki paradigmal değişimleri kavramamaktan kaynaklandığını iddia etmiştir. Bu paradigmal farklılaşmanın sonucu olarak Türkiye için çoklu kimliğini vurgulamasının bir seçenek değil bir dış politika gerekliliği olduğunu iddia edilmektedir. Bu noktada dünyaya ve Türkiye'nin kimliği ve rolüne ilişkin düşünsel faktörlerin dış politikadaki rolünün önemi açıkça görülmektedir. Düşünsel unsurlar, bir hükümetin dış politika yapımı sürecinde kendisi için neyin önemli neyin önemsiz olduğunu tanımlayan varsayım ve değerler kümesini oluşturmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda farklı değer kümeleri üzerinden bakıldığında başarı ve başarısızlık yorumları da değişiklik gösterecektir. O halde AKP dış politikasında düşünsel unsurlar nelerdir? Bu unsurlara bakıldığında Türkiye'nin önceki hükümetler döneminde öne çıkan Avrupa merkezli dış politikasında bir eksen kayması veya derin bir değişim gözlemlemek mümkün müdür? Bu sorulara cevap ararken dış politikanın ideoloğu olan Davutoğlu'nun söylemlerini incelemek bize önemli veriler sunabilir. Özellikle 6 Temmuz 2011 ila 28 Ağustos 2014 tarihleri arasındaki 61. Hükümet döneminde Davutoğlu'nun uygulamada da bizzat etkin olarak yer aldığı ve dış işleri bakanı olduğu düşünülerek önemlidir Bu dönemde Davutoğlu ve o dönemin Başbakanı olan R. Tayyip Erdoğan'ın söylemleri önemli kaynaklardır. Çalışmanın ilk bulguları gerek Türkiye'de gerek AB üyesi ülkelerin hükümetlerinin yaklaşımında farklı

düşünce şekillerinin öne çıktığı yönündedir. Daha yakın dönemdeki tartışmalar da bu görüşü doğrular niteliktedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AKP, AKP Dış Politikası, AB, Avrupa Kimliği

Introduction

In the current discourse of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's European identity is not no longer emphasized whereas Turkey's solidarity with other regions is frequently underlined, based on the country's multiple identities. That is, the Turkish government considers Turkey as a Middle Eastern as well as European country. This multiple solidarity perspective is explained by the governmental officials through culturalist arguments that are strongly critical of 'vapid' Eurocentric approaches with reference to changing world politics. Turkish opposition groups see this new perspective as a kind of shift of axis. However, Davutoglu accuses them of misunderstanding the changing paradigm of current world politics, where a multiple identity perspective is not just a preference but a necessity. Here, it is essential to understand the government's ideational settings that demarcate what is important and valuable. Even the evaluation of success is tightly related with ideas and ideologies. What, then, are the ideational settings of JDP foreign policy? Does it represent a shift from Turkey's previous European oriented foreign policy? Analysis of the discourse of leading figures in Turkey's foreign policy making processes is critical to answer these questions.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is chosen as the focus of analysis in this study, especially during the 61sth Turkish government between 6 July 2011 and 28 August 2014. The main claim of this study is the way of thinking has changed in both Turkey and European governments. The formalistic approach in the EU has reached its natural limits, while the culturalist perspective and romanticism are the current leading issues. This study therefore contrasts the rationalist formalist approach with the rise of romanticism in Turkey's domestic politics as a part of foreign policy construction.

Rising role of Identity in Foreign Policy and different approaches

In order to understand state behaviors, different epistemological approaches brought different explanations. Positivist, modernist epistemology with causal explanations puts determining factors as standard for all states. However, reflectivist approaches criticizes that standardization with a post-positivist epistemology by underlining subjectivity of social conducts. In this subjectivity, identity and ideational factors are considered so critical. Social constructivism tries to combine those for a theory that has capacity to explain happenings in IR.

According to social constructivism, states as agents act on ideas and knowledge, which enables them to reconstruct the international structure. Alexander Wendt claims that the "structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas" (Wendt, 2006:139). He claims that, without ideas, there is no interest, no material conditions and no reality at all. Here, structures can be local, national or international, all of which are related to each other, with the individual being at the center because of the determinant role of prominent figures in politics. Therefore, leaders, dominant political groups and political power are important for their ability to structure reality and knowledge consistent with their ideas.

Alexander Wendt argues that "people act towards objects, including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have for them" (Wendt, 2006: 140). He adds that the "ideational aspect of social structure might now be seen as a 'distribution of knowledge'" that "includes not only Beliefs but a good portion of Desire". Ideas, beliefs and desires are mostly individual centered concepts. In fact, common and shared knowledge based on ideas are important for political cultures and constructing collective memory. Culture is socially shared knowledge, common and connected between individuals (Wendt, 2006:141). In addition, it is

possible to talk about common and collective knowledge cultures interconnected with each other. While the common culture could be located in a society, collective culture can be the outcome of the interconnectedness of actors.

From this point of view, any social system, domestic or international, consists of a balance of material conditions and ideas. Within this balance, idealism can highlight the role of ideas and desires. If this idealism has popular support, it can encourage more reference to desires than material conditions. Here, popular culture has great importance because of its capacity to give clues about desires. It should not be forgotten that national political cultures with great emphasis on social memory evolve through interaction with other actors. Thus, the rise of ideals in politics should be evaluated together with both domestic political factors and international relations. Today's multilateralism and rising idealism for a normative global order may be presented as a valuable example of the influence of external factors on domestic politics.

Social memory as common and collective knowledge has great influence in making foreign policy. As Wendt puts it, "group beliefs are often inscribed in 'collective memory', the myths, narratives, and traditions that constitute who a groups is and how it relates to others" (Wendt, 2006: 163). These narratives are not "held by individuals at any given moment, but [are] inherently historical phenomena which are kept alive through the generations by an ongoing process of socialization". Thus, collective memories are a leading factor in political thinking and mobilization.

At this point, it is important to refer to the constructed character of collective memory, together with the construction of identity. Common values, ways of thinking and ways of life are essential parts of that identity and determine what a culture is. In other words, culture is essential for defining who we and the 'others' are. This makes it crucial to mention the interconnectivity of culture and religion in the definition of the self and the other. As a greater category than culture, civilization has profound connections with religion.

All we have discussed so far about subjective factors and their role in state behaviors has also been referred to frequently in international relations along with constructivism. Neither is it something new to refer to the role of history, culture and identity in social analysis. During the interwar years, culture was regarded as an important element to explain social behaviors, with Florian Znaniecki and Pitirim A. Sorokin declaring that social sciences are cultural sciences (Halas, 2010: 28). This cultural sociology was then revised as a form of culturalism. During the Cold War, on the other hand, foreign policy analysis depended on methods derived from economics that concentrate on deterministic approaches by disregarding the influence of culture. As happened in foreign policy analysis, political science has also been impressed by the scientific assertions of economics since the 1950s (Çavdar & Yaşar, 2014: 39). In order to produce scientific knowledge, political scientists tended to use objective variables, involving the "colonization of political science by neoclassical economics" (Chalmes Johnson, 1997: 170). This is important because it refers to human nature and explains the reasons for that behavior. According to this definition, individuals, who are fully aware of their interests, try to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. It makes various assumptions about individual characteristics, namely "fully ordered preferences," "complete information" and "a perfect internal computer" (Martin Hollis 1995: 116; emphasis in original). "Since the axioms apply to any time and society, rational agents can be consumers, producers, the state, voters, or the whole nation, just as their underlying motivations may include buying, selling, being autocratic, marrying, voting, or making a decision about war or peace (Çavdar & Yaşar, 2014: 39)." This approach, which depends on neoclassical economics, is defined as formalism, as value-free, objective, scientific research, because it usually promotes quantitative techniques to measure individual behaviors because of the above assumptions about the individuals.

In fact, it is not possible to start social scientific analysis by removing the influences of culture and subjective elements from the analysis. As Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky noted, language and culture play essential roles in both human intellectual development and how humans perceive the world (Vygotsky, 1978:39). In short, human cognitive structures are socially constructed: "knowledge is not simply constructed, it is co-constructed" (Vygotsky, 1978).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, liberal internationalism tried to overcome the difficulties of subjectivity in creation of shared truths. Interest definitions depending on capitalist economy and rationalism are the basis of cooperation with modernist secular assumptions. That was important for human progress because liberalism underlined the threat to exhaustion of all energy of humanity for irrational emotional targets. That means that welfare and peace are promised in the liberal internationalism. European integration is one example of the power of liberal mechanisms to solve problems deriving from subjective factors. Common economic targets and unity around a common framework have promoted European integration, while rational thinking that depends on material benefits rather than subjective emotional approaches is also central to this process. Formalism through the construction of common standards of behaviors on the base of liberal assumptions is very central at that point.

However, the 1980s raised questions about the future of integration. Together with the search for a European identity in the 1990s, subjective factors started to play a much more apparent role. M. J. Faber argues that structural, social and spiritual integration are all necessary to define European identity within European integration (Faber, 1994: 35). Structural integration in politics is necessary for new superstructures to appear to promote liberal democracy and human rights as central European values. Social integration is necessary to construct a new society on the basis of trans-border features. Spiritual integration of citizens is also essential, through a 'citizen religion' based on the recognition of a common life style and values such as equality, liberty and fraternity. Thus, with a citizen religion, European identity may transcend existing national cultures. This project to create a European culture is considered as a threat by many political groups in Europe. Especially increased diversity in European countries together with immigration has created novel forms of nationalist reactions against a secular EU identity. Here, the EU project has started to fight against culturalist assumptions based totally on subjectivity. Especially, the post-Cold War understanding of Europeanness in cultural and religious terms has transformed the cluster of exclusionary and oppressive practices directed toward the Muslim populations of Europe (Özyürek, 2005:509). Turkey's EU membership bid is also another clue to seeing the culturalization of politics. Turkey's membership is categorized as difficult because of Turkey's differences to Europe. However, this perspective has provoked criticisms about universalization of Western norms, since it is preoccupied with so much reference to culture. According to the critics, the acculturation of people in Western culture cannot be the sole method of coexistence. Instead, the search for alternative ways offers inspiration against neoclassical economics, formalism and universal truths. Postmodernism has provoked the rediscovery of culture in human behaviors, which reminds us about romanticism.

Contradictions between romanticism and formalism are related to their approaches to modernism. Romanticism emerged as a reaction against Modernist thinking, although it is modern in its references to the Enlightenment. Romanticism puts love and enthusiasm against reason/mind. It is important because Romanticism is a movement against given standards and defined "rules", searching for another way to explain social phenomena. With its references to spirit, values and the wisdom of societies, Romanticism offers a culturalist perspective for analyzing politics.

Hasan Aksakal outlines the premises of Romanticism and Modernism that encourage a formalistic approach. Modernity's basic assumptions are as follows (Aksakal, 2015: 53-54):

- Promotion of industrialization, modern accounting systems, urbanization, 'change' and 'progress'
- Finding new methods of production
- Progress in technology and science
- Expansion of technological advancement with increased complexity and capacity of communication networks
- Rising professional expertise versus artisanal activities behind
- Commodification of everything that can be sold or bought
- Promotion of state control mechanisms over society despite the emergence of civil society
- Diffusion of a secular world view that is incorporated with a freedom discourse into public opinion through mass media (e.i. newspapers)
- Utilization of nature for endless human needs

In contrast, Romanticism introduced its own principles against the crisis resulting from capitalist modernity, as follows (Aksakal, 2015: 54):

- Natural versus artificial, with the latter being the product of modernism's ceaseless efforts to change the natural in order to achieve 'perfection' (Aksakal: 61)
- Qualitative versus quantitative
- Poetical versus analytical
- Spirit versus the mind
- self-enhancement versus materialistic profit

Romanticism refers to a golden age in history in contrast to modernity's focus on the future through change, engineering and by creating order and progress within a linear understanding of history. However, Romanticist reference to history has raised several objections which accuses them being a reactionary movement. In contrast to modern formalism, which regards the past as useless rubbish, Romanticism views the past as an organic and natural construct against the artificial and superficial structures created in modern societies. This attempt to promote an organic form of society can be seen in rural areas that have escaped the control of modernist top-down social construction projects. Romanticism critically evaluates Modernism in terms of industrial revolution, urbanization and urban ways of life within capitalism, all of which it stands against. Romanticists criticize modernist progress as being responsible for two world wars and various genocides.

In addition, whereas Modernism searches for a neutral zone of secularism, free from religious conflicts, to provide space to work for progress, Romanticism has no sympathy for secularism because it considers religion as an important component of culture. Romanticism prefers a chivalric sprit over accountants, wisdom that derives from barbaric-gothic traditions over saloon gentlemen, capital accumulated from agricultural activity over Jewish usury as representative of some hidden social power (Aksakal, 2015:70).

Romanticism has been more prominent in Eastern and Southeast European politics. According to Dennis P. Hupchick, Romanticism was a reaction against the post-French war (Napoleonic War) repressive climate (Hupchick, 2002: 194). The Romanticist nationalist movement in the Habsburg Empire, Russia and Prussia blamed Enlightenment's rationalism and Industrial Revolution's rampant materialism for the repression. In contrast, these Romanticists favored emotionalism and escapism "into a fictionalized Medieval past dominated by emotions as mythology and religion" (Hupchick). They underlined the value of "native" cultural realities uncorrupted by the "foreign", meaning the Classical Greco-Roman elements introduced during the Renaissance. By knowing and understanding themselves, native cultures have created concepts of ethnicity and ethnic awareness. Ethnic uniqueness is closely linked to religion and language. Here, religion is defined as the emotional expression of civilization.

Thus, Romanticism added an emotional dimension to the concept of the nation (Hupchick: 194). This mixture of a novel definition of consciousness also included a reactive stance by smaller nations due to the assumptions of superiority of Western European economic development and the empires in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This superiority and inferiority created another motivation for efforts to emphasize the glorious days in the small country's history and its natural culture.

Romanticism and formalism in the construction of self and other in Turkey

As a part of Balkan political history, Turkey has been influenced by modernity. Nationalism and Western European ideas have affected Turkey in a similar way to other Balkan countries. Turkey achieved many social reforms based on premises of modernity in its painful transformation from a multiethnic empire to a nation state. Turkey had to redefine its identity through a top-down process led by its political elites. For a long period of time, Republican Turkey did not refer to its Ottoman heritage although it remained an important reference point for opposing conservative right-wing political movements. This transformation from the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey is considered as a change of civilization. REFERANS

Since the 19th century Turkish intelligentsia and elites has defined Turkish identity with reference to Europe. In fact, traditionalist Islamist groups have always been against Westernization of social values and culture. Europeanization and the Westernization in the meaning industrialization and technological advancement were regarded as positive. However, duplication European culture with all its aspects still remained undesirable. Modern Turkey adopted a modernization and Europeanization perspective with all aspects as a modernist project. Hence, the famous Turkish ideologue Ziya Gökalp categorized modern Turkey as part of European civilization although he referred to the Ottoman era as belonging to Eastern civilization (Gökalp, 1978:60). This is particularly problematic for those Turkish citizens who feel solidarity with Islamic values and Turkey's Ottoman past.

Republican Turkey's modern European national identity depended on civic attachment so religion was limited to the private realm with the aim to "prevent its public and political manifestations as much as possible" (Nas, 2001: p.180). Republican modernization and Westernization reforms were criticized for by being against religious and cultural values. In addition, conservative Islamic opposition groups regarded Turkey's efforts to become a part of Europe as hopeless because of European negative perceptions, mainly due to religious and cultural factors.

In 20th century Turkish intellectual life, concepts of culture and civilization concepts were frequently used. However, using civilization to refer to development and progress outside of the Western world caused a reaction. Consequently, the search of another civilization belonging to 'us' and the way this native culture interacted with the Western world became an important topic of discussion.

Civilization may be a disturbing concept because of its potential to differentiate cultures within a confrontational political framework. In constructing the idea of civilization, self and other are constructed together. Thus, as is obvious in Orientalism, Occidentalism creates its own other no matter the realities. As a result of a longstanding political confrontation with the Ottoman Empire, Occidentalism evolved among the Turkish intelligentsia. Aksakal argues that it is possible to see both exaggerated appreciation of and exaggerated criticism of the West and a gradually increasing negative conception of Europe in the writings of Turkish intellectuals such as Namık Kemal, Cemil Meriç, Sezai Karakoç and Mehmet Akif (Aksakal, Türk, 2015: 74). As an example of Islamist romanticism, Namık Kemal and Ziya Gökalp argued that Western civilization developed from Islamic civilization, with Gökalp claiming that Turks were the founders of that civilization (Gökalp, 1976: 163-164). Thus, the other has been the West, specifically Europe in constructing Turkish self. Hasan Aksakal presents Cemil Meric as another example of Turkish Romanticism with Islamic references (Aksakal, Türk, 2015:79).

Meric argues that mind is the enemy of ingenuity and faith, adding that, while the 'victorious Western civilization' can raise engineers with its belief in mind/reason, a civilization depending on faith can raise heroes. He criticizes Enlightenment and materialism, arguing that they are inappropriate for the human nature with their overemphasis of numbers and quantitative analysis. In contrast, faith is noble with its potential to produce a civilization. Turkish romanticists have used novels and poems to explain their ideas. Mehmet Akif's and Sezai Karakoc's poems present many of the details mentioned above that offer clues to the definition of Turkey's identity with respect to civilization notion.

Their Islamic stance was not welcomed within the secular Republic of Turkey. They criticized the effects of modernization reforms on all aspects of social life as a social engineering. The reforms have a target to change individuals' way of life through enforcement of law and punishment that has been considered as not legitimate and acceptable. They searched a way of self-expression of their thoughts, but it is not allowed in a system that focuses on complete transformation of a society. Its priority was not respect to the values and preferences of people. As result of this pressure, conservative right-wing political movements started to sympathize more with liberal democracy because it leaves a space for individual freedom and way of life. Consequently, after multiparty democracy has been realized, demands of conservative groups transferred into the politics. Increasing participation of the masses, allowed a softening of the Republicans' western oriented and secular ideology (Nas, 2001: 184) because the majority of Turkey's population was living in rural areas in accordance with Islamic faith. That is, the masses reacted against modernization and the westernization project.

This background is important to explain the influence of Romanticism in JDP discourse. For example, Mehmet Akif and Sezai Karakoç are two key poets frequently referred in public speeches by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In all references to Mehmet Akif, Erdogan emphasizes his strict morality and faith against materialism. It is possible to see in Akif's verses a critic of 'civilization' that is conceptualized as modern Western world. Western civilization is notorious for exploitation of oppressed people for material interests in these critiques. This approach is significant because it enables the JDP to create a correlation between the world order dominated by the West and current global injustices and inequalities.

As with post-colonialist Islamic movements elsewhere, different fractions of Islamists emerged in the political arena in Turkey between the 1970s and 2000s. Democracy and a liberal economic understanding were regarded as an integral part of these new traditionalist and religious groups. Human rights, democracy and republicanism for promotion of values of traditional Turkish people became much more apparent in political discussions. This allowed the periphery to become integrated into mainstream politics (Nas, 2001: 185). This periphery had different values to Turkey's urbanized elites who are closely connected with Western intellectual life. Thus, periphery, named as *millet* as opposed to elites is considered as an important legitimizing force.

Especially after the end of the Cold War, political and cultural matters, including human rights and democracy, became much more prominent in the discussion of progress and development. Islamists and other groups critical of Turkey's Kemalist elites, believed that European Union membership might transform Turkey towards better democratic standards. Thus it became a part of the identity discussions of traditionalists. At this point the EU has been instrumentalized. REFERANS

However it is not possible to deny transformation of introverted political Islamic understanding to extravert one along with global changes. Demands of victimized groups, especially Muslim people have been in political discourse of political Islam. The end of the Cold War had an important impact on Turkish politics as postcolonial discourses and Islamic arguments started to become a part of Turkish politics. Western norms and values were reevaluated more critically against the supremacy of the Western values. According to the

principles of liberal democracy, they pronounced the demand of equality and respect. That may be explained as influence of evaluation of new Islamic political identity in world politics in Turkey especially in 2000s.

Davutoglu argues that Turgut Ozal as a liberal politician tried to create a connection between traditional and liberal values. That is, he tried to create a new political identity and culture in order to find solutions to problems deriving from new international conditions. Davutoglu finds a correlation between neo-Ottomanism in the *Tanzimat (*reformation) period and Ozal's approach in that both tried to harmonize the Islamic and traditional values of Turkish society with western liberal conceptions (Davutoglu, 2001: 85). Ernur Genç argues that these efforts by Islamic intellectuals to give Islamic meanings to Western concepts like democracy or human rights represent a modern approach (Genç, 2012: 217). She therefore claims that even the most critical comments against Western values are merely instruments to transform existing modern Western structures.

An important example of radical political Islamism in Turkey with references to international order is the Welfare Party *(Refah Partisi)*. As an Islamist political party, it criticized other parties and political leaders as puppets of Western imperialism. The Welfare Party was subsequently closed for endangering secularism and attempts to create a replacement party were blocked by Kemalist government. The Welfare Party's ideology reflected Islamist political literature against Western domination and hegemony. According to the Welfare Party, Western culture corrupted the lives of Muslims while Western political and economic domination had devastating consequences for Muslim societies (Ayata, 2004: 243). These criticisms became the mottos of political Islam. From this perspective, Islam presented an alternative to liberal Western values, making it a challenger. The "Just Order" was one of the most important policies of the Welfare Party, presenting an alternative model of social and economic relations based on Islamic principles.

The JDP emerged as a moderate reformist faction within the discourse of political Islam in Turkey. The party's focus on concepts like justice and development were important proof of its neoliberal perspective. Leading founders of the party emphasized that "they had thoroughly adopted liberal economic and political values … and [were] committed to secularism and democracy, as well as Turkey's historical ambition of integrating with Western world" (Ayata: 247).

The timing of the rise of the JDP is interesting as it was a new era with frequent reference to human rights, civil society and democracy, which became key concepts in Islamic political discourse, too. In particular, Islamic intellectuals and politicians used these concepts to engage in dialogue with the West. Rising ethnic and religious demands within the Western world's pluralist conceptualization of human rights created great interest among Islamic groups in Turkey (Ayata: 243).

This ideological background determined the ideational elements of the JDP's foreign policy, with two key figures, Davutoğlu and Erdogan, shaping Turkish political preferences. Although they have different social backgrounds, their shared ideology is based on political Islam and conservative right-wing nationalist movements. ‚As Foreign Minister of Turkey's 61st government, Davutoğlu was influential in foreign policy together with Prime Minister Erdogan. They have different profiles. Whereas Erdogan rose through political party organizations, Davutoglu was previously more of an academic then a politician. Therefore, he uses different terminology, such as words like epistemology. In fact, understanding this terminology is critical to understand the JDP's ideational background.

Both men refer to religious and cultural motives that are mostly shared by conservative Anatolian people. Thus, their sociological profiles differ from the ruling Westernized secular elites of the Republican era. As seen in Ziya Gökalp's definition, Islam and the Turkish state are closely connected in their analyses of civilization. Islamist and nationalist JDP cadres define

Turks as a leading group in the *Umma*. This perspective creates an ideological base for rising Turkish foreign policy interest in Islamic countries while weakening the national identity based on modern Western ideas. This means that as Muslim politicians, they have to care about co-religionists in other countries due to Islamic beliefs. As a state policy, Turkey has an historical responsibility deriving from the Ottoman Empire. That prized historical background I regarded as an important source of legitimacy and motivation to act for Muslims in Turkey's near abroad. Ottoman past makes Turkey a central actor in its region.

This perspective has gained popular support because many of the masses in Anatolia either originally immigrated from the Balkans and Caucasus, or have close relatives in other Middle Eastern countries. These people are mostly religious and care about what is happening in their ancestral homelands. Thus, Davutoglu refers to the frontier as a very important concept as part of the JDP's near abroad understanding. He emphasizes frontier instead of border, because a border makes the country introverted while a frontier promotes an extrovert perspective. It means that having influence in the near abroad is assumed to be a natural phenomenon.

The JDP and the liberal Islamic tradition explain the world from an introverted perspective with reference to "our values". Davutoglu adds a new perspective for political Islam with many references to philosophical and theoretical discussions in political science. He stresses the need for Turkey to participate more in international platforms while Islamic communities should promote their ideas as a contribution to the construction of a new world order. Davutoglu is apparently extravert, criticizing the current world order and state of affairs in domestic politics as an integral field of action. He refers to late modernity rather than post-modernity in order to explain his criticisms of the current world. He criticizes the idea of constructing a new world order on secular foundations, arguing instead that a religious perspective creates more depth in the search of a new world order (Davutoglu, 2002: 50). He evaluates the need for change within a different paradigm. According to him, we are now in a period of transition to another world order after the end of the Cold War. This presents an opportunity to construct more cosmopolitan world governance for a fair, just and ordered world based on equality. During this transformation, Turkey must play a role as both a regional and global actor. This is not such a strange demand in the current world of communication that can even give an individual influence on public opinion and policy-making processes. Old fashioned nationalistic ideas rather than policies are the problem in such an ideal world. Davutoglu therefore argues that a paradigmatic shift is necessary in our way of thinking. Being a constitutive actor in this transition process is critical to be influential in the new world order.

Davutoglu's perspective provides a new definition of national interest that refers to interconnectedness between all societies. That is, his ideas depend on societies rather than nation states. Societies have memories and common cultures drawn from geography and history. It is not possible to cut this interconnectedness between societies. If it were cut, this would not be a natural condition so it could not survive as an order. Nation states have made exactly this unnatural transformation. Such arguments, exemplify the Romanticism in Davutoglu's perspective.

However, the leading cadres of the JDP aware that the modern world still functions and that Turkey should continue to accept the nation-state order, based on equality and international law, in order to be a respectful actor in international relations. Therefore, Davutoglu also refers to many key assumptions of liberal internationalism and multilateralism while explaining his understanding (Mert Uzuner, 2014).

Because of their Islamic discourse, Erdogan and Davutoglu have been condemned as radical Islamists who are changing the country's axis from a secular republic to an Islamic state. In particular, increasing contacts with Middle Eastern countries and reactionary discourses against the EU have increased tensions in domestic politics. Turkey's application for full EU

membership and the subsequent disappointments about its candidacy have provoked anti-European feelings in domestic politics. Meanwhile, culturalist anti-Turkish speeches in Europe have provoked discussions about a secular, civic versus a civilizational European identity in both Turkey and Europe.

Romanticism or formalism in Turkey-EU relations

In the 2000s, Turkey's EU membership bid has been discussed in terms of both the EU's material formal criteria but also in reference to culturalist assumptions. Bulent Aras recognized how Turkish foreign policy towards the EU had changed as a result of Turkey's changing domestic political landscape (Aras, 2013: 3). Aras prefers the term 'EU/rope' in order to underline the cultural aspect of the issue in foreign policy conceptions. He defines the novelty a new geopolitical thinking rooted in the self-confidence and recognition of Turkey's multiple identities (Aras, 2013). Within this framework of Turkey's foreign policy identity, its European perspective cannot be considered superior to its oriental identity. This reference to an oriental identity and self-confidence is interesting as a critical approach of the government against the humiliation of the Orient and efforts to create solidarity with Europe in order to be part of the civilized world. In this critique, Turkey's history and the construction of Turkey's identity are important. As the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey should recognize the significance of its history that has had deep social and cultural impacts. Fikret Adanır explains this role by referring to systemic changes in the international order. He argues that the Ottoman Empire was considered as an actor that fully observed European public law since the beginning of the 18th century (Adanır, 2005: 395). This implies that it became part of the European order rather than a challenger against Europe. This change was necessary to the country's survival strategy within the new state system. However, the comprehensive ideational impact on Turkey cannot be denied. Davutoglu claims that this transformation of the country's role in international politics has had a domestic aspect through domestic reforms. That is, the relevant reformation efforts were part of political, economic and social modernization efforts under the guidance of European ideas. Bulent Aras argues that there are similar features in Turkey's current EU accession process and its implications for domestic politics (Aras, 2013: 5). Thus, he argues that the historical connection has left a permanent European trace in the style and preferences of Turkish foreign policy (Aras, 2013: 5).

As another sign of Romanticism, self-confidence and embracing of self-identity is regarded as an important part of a successful foreign policy in the current world order. Thus, the survival strategy hidden behind the Europeanization perspective should be reevaluated according to Davutoglu. This approach is important to understand Davutoglu's assumption about Turkey's role as central country. As an EU member with multiple identities, Turkey may offer great opportunities to the EU, according to Davutoglu, to be a global actor. Turkey's Ottoman background is important for its self-confidence. For example, JDP leaders frequently refer to the country's historical depth as a civilization founder and leader, which increases Turkey's importance in the EU process.

This perspective should be explained through Davutoglu's references to cultural and civilizational assumptions about the world order. Turkey's identity as also an oriental country with the values of Islamic civilization is important for its role. Davutoglu refers to world cultural revival, defining it as a revival of the erudition of humanity in the form of a different civilization (Davutoglu: 2013, 43-44). The rise of different cultures is important to him to increase diversity in Western civilization. Accordingly, the Ottoman conflictual history against Europe as the representative of an alternative civilization is stressed in many JDP government speeches.

However, the dominance of a culturalist perspective is not only because of Turkey's preferences since it also relates to changes in the perspectives of European governments. Ayhan Kaya argues that the rise of culturalism is a result of the preferences of European governments (Kaya, 2013:67). German, British and French leaders have publicly dismissed the policy of

multiculturalism. Kaya argues that migration and securitization of ethno-cultural relations are the main reasons for the failure of multiculturalism. As a result of bombings in western capitals by radical Islamists, tolerance and multiculturalism have faced criticism. Thus, in European politics, the Judeo-Christian tradition has been presented as distinguishing 'us' from 'foreigners', which leaves less democratic space to voice minority demands. Kaya argues that the present disorder derives from poverty, xenophobia, unemployment and discrimination and nationalism. These problems also explain migrants' ethnic, religious or identity claims. Kaya says that governments hide the real reasons; instead, they lead public opinion by staging an existential threat in the form of internal and external enemies.

Kaya says that tolerance and multiculturalism draws attention away from the real problems which are social, economic and political, not cultural or civilizational (Kaya: 70-73) Islamophobia or seeing Muslims as an 'enemy within' is a construct of European governmentality according to Chris Allen (Kaya, 2013: 77).

In this context, Turkey has accepted the discourse of the international community about its role of bridging between civilizations as a so-called moderate Islamic state. Kaya argues that PM Erdogan and other politicians in the JDP have accept this definition under the expectation of a favorable outcome in Turkey's European integration (Kaya, 2013: 78). Thus, there is a parallel rise of civilizational discourses in both Europe and in Turkey. This acceptance of civilizational discourse is based on both rational calculations and ideational factors. The ideological background of the JDP's leaders are critical for accepting this role, as is Turkey's Ottoman past since Ottoman multiculturalism and tolerance are two integral parts of the civilizational discourse.

It is not possible to talk about the instrumentalization of Turkey within the European culturalist discourse. Romanticist approach of Turkish leadership in the JDP is important to accept such a foreign policy identity. Turkey recognizes itself as an important actor with its potential. He goes further than European culturalism, and he emphasizes the potential of Turkey in the process of creation of another world. The problems in Turkey's EU membership process are considered as resulting from a lack of visionary leadership. Turkey argues that Europe's current leadership should abandon their negative attitudes because the EU is in search of its soul (Davutoglu, 2009: 15). The EU started as a formalistic project because it prioritized economic and social progress stemming from a liberal economy, but according to Davutoglu it is time to be visionary by not afraid from different cultures. In Turkish foreign policy discourse, it is possible to see recognition of Turkey's differences that do not deny Turkey's European identity. Nowadays, however, it is necessary to discuss how to transform European identity into a global player with an enlarged geopolitical imagination (Davutoglu, 2009:14).

Conclusion

As an Islamic conservative party, the JDP in its discourse demonstrates a similar pattern to postcolonial literature that criticizes Western domination. The rising interconnectedness of people from different cultures and their demands to have equal rights by denying the hegemonic position of Western culture have created great problems. In particular, immigrants to the EU from other faiths are considered as foreign although they are legal citizens. This can be called a crisis of identity that has given a dominant role to the notion of civilization. However, this is contrary to the EU project that depends on a formalist rationalist secular understanding. The crisis of identity has created a hegemony of culturalist assumptions that securitize identity differences, which has destroyed multiculturalism. This tide of self-defense, expressed through culturalist discourse, has affected the EU's hinterland, including Turkey. As a predominantly Muslim EU candidate, Turkey has faced significant culturalist opposition from European countries, based on a conceptualization of Western civilization. The role of religion and the notion of civilization have emerged as factors within the definition of European identity.

However, this tendency is against the idea of secular multicultural European identity that depends on the co-construction of European values with all 'European' people. However, the construction of a new European identity has been neglected. This process of the novel construction of self and other has offered a basis to revive Romanticism in politics, which has become very popular in conservative right-wing movements. It is not an alternative to ideology but offers a general perspective through basic assumptions and values. It is important because it also provides a space for subjectivity and desires considered important in current political opposition in international relations.

JDP ideologues refer to Europeanization, which depends on EU values, as the shared accumulation of human progress so they want to be a part of this process. According to them, Islamophobia and European supremacism are the main obstacles to this. However, it is possible to see their Romanticism through their frequent references to the supremacy of the spiritual over the mind, of qualitative over quantitative, and natural over artificial. Moreover, as the main figure of the JDP, Erdogan regularly refers to emotions, conscience, heroism and self-confidence in his speeches. It is also clear that Ottoman history is used by both Erdogan and Davutoglu as an example of a more humane order. Romanticism is important for imagining an alternative way of thinking. Is it good or bad? It is difficult to answer it because it is not possible to judge it according to a neutral variable. On the contrary, Romanticism refers subjective elements. So the evaluation of goodness or badness depends on personal or group's values and judgements. The JDP provides examples of Romanticist, culturalist critical discourse in the search for a more liberal liberalism. Within this discourse, EU membership is a clear objective, but the problem is how to define European identity.

Currently, there is talk of a paradigm shift to establish a new world. This framework includes a shift away from modernization and a move towards greater respect and equality. Ultimately, what has already been defined as universal truths is easy to change.

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